Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he individual income tax system in the United States operates on a self-assessment basis, in which individuals annually determine their tax liability and pay what they deem due. Over time, a taxpayer learns more about the tax system, so that reports today may depend in part on reports in the past. An individual can also communicate with or be infl uenced by other fi lers in choosing how much to report, so that her/his reporting decision may depend in part on the decisions of others. Put differently, insofar as a taxpayer may recall his or her own past fi ling experience and may communicate in some ways with other taxpayers, these issues help shape the taxpayer's current report. Thus, two phenomena emerge from past reporting experience and from the exchange of information and experiences with other fi lers, one relating to dynamic effects (or persistence) in the taxpayer's reporting decision and the other relating to spatial dependence (or interdependence) across all taxpayers.
Dynamic effects suggest that this year's evasion decision is affected by past evasion experience. There is, therefore, an element of persistence in individual income tax evasion decisions. As suggested by Dubin (2007) , this may also be due to the delayed audit completion cycle. He argues that "… taxpayers may adjust their reported taxes based on a mixture of taxes reported in the previous year and the optimal level
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of taxes due based on existing or current conditions" (p. 508).
There are several possible explanations for spatial dependence in tax evasion. Individuals typically exchange their experiences with others, so they infl uence and are influenced by the tax evasion behavior of other taxpayers.
1 Further, if one taxpayer successfully evades because he or she is not audited, then (given the audit resources available to the tax administration) this may increase the probability that another taxpayer will be audited. Still another explanation may be due to a "social norm" of compliance. A social norm can be distinguished by the feature that it is process-oriented, unlike the outcome-orientation of individual rationality (Elster, 1989) . A social norm represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that, therefore, is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval: if others behave according to some socially accepted mode of behavior, then the individual will also behave appropriately, but if others do not so behave, then the individual will respond in kind. Consequently, an individual will comply as long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm; if noncompliance becomes pervasive, then the social norm of compliance disappears.
2 Manski (1991) and McFadden (2006) suggest still another, related explanation for interdependence. Both argue that individuals faced with dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose immense computational challenges may look to others to infer satisfactory policies, so that interdependence may come simply from imitating others, perhaps through social networks. These twin issues of persistence and spatial dependence are seldom raised in the theoretical or empirical analyses of tax evasion, at least not in tandem. This is our purpose in this paper. We fi rst extend the original Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion by incorporating both issues. We then test their empirical validity in the context of the U.S. federal individual income tax evasion. We use state-level, time-series, cross-section data for the years 1979 to 1997, collected from a variety of sources, to estimate the factors that affect annual per return evasion in the individual income tax. The estimation methods use several econometric models that incorporate both spatial dependence and dynamic considerations and that also consider the potential endogeneity of the audit rate. When estimation methods appropriately consider these issues, the empirical results indicate strong and robust support for both spatiality and persistence in tax 1 For example, Stalans, Kinsey, and Smith (1991) discuss the role of taxpayer-taxpayer communication in tax compliance decision. For an experimental analysis of such taxpayer-taxpayer communication, see Alm, Jackson, and McKee (2009) . 2 The notion that one's own voluntary compliance depends in part on the sense that others are compliant is a common one. For example, Davis, Hecht, and Perkins (2003) examine the role of social norms using an "epidemic" model of compliance. They demonstrate that changing enforcement levels can have very different effects on aggregate compliance, depending on the strength and prevalence of the initial social norm of compliance. If the initial social norm is strong (e.g., if the population is initially compliant), then changes in enforcement levels have little impact on group compliance, at least until enforcement becomes suffi ciently lax; in contrast, if the initial social norm is weak, then taxpayers respond to increased enforcement by gradually increasing compliance until enforcement becomes suffi ciently harsh, at which point they change to a very high level of compliance. As Davis, Hecht, and Perkins (2003) conclude, "… …our models' results help explain why taxpayer compliance varies across time and across geographic regions, even under similar enforcement regimes" (p. 39). For additional analyses of the role of social norms in compliance, see Scholz and Pinney (1995) , Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan (1995) , Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) , Frey and Feld (2002) , Scholz (2003) , and Alm and McKee (2004) . Lederman (2003) provides a useful survey of much of this work.
evasion. The results also show a large deterrent effect from higher audit rates.
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In the next section we briefl y review past empirical studies conducted on individual income tax compliance. We then extend the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model by incorporating persistence and spatiality. The following section deals with data and related methodological issues, including the methods employed in the empirical work, analytical issues related to the construction of variables, and descriptive statistics. We then present our estimation results, fi rst examining the spatiality and persistence issues separately and then suggesting and implementing a way to combine them. In the fi nal section we summarize our fi ndings and discuss their implications.
SOME PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES
We focus here on those empirical studies that directly link to our twin points of departure, especially those that use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) time-series data, and we confi ne ourselves to individual income tax evasion only.
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The first time-series studies are by Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987; , who estimate the determinants of income tax reporting as a function of audit rates and various socio-economic variables, using state-level, time-series, cross-section data from the Annual Report of the IRS for the years [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] . Both studies recognize the potential endogeneity of the audit rate, and accordingly use the two stage least squares (2SLS) method to control for endogeneity. Both fi nd that the audit rate is endogenous; after controlling for this endogeneity, both fi nd that higher audit rates often have a positive impact on income tax reporting but one that varies by audit class and one that is not always statistically signifi cant.
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These studies also fi nd that there is a spillover effect from tax audits; that is, taxpayers who are not themselves audited pay more in taxes when audit rates increase. Plumley (1996) extends the analysis of Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987; , using state-level data from 1982 to 1991. He finds that criminal investigation enforcement activities are significant and positively related to compliance. Dubin (2007) also builds on these analyses by using state-level, cross-section, time-series data from 1988 and 2001 to examine the effects of criminal investigation enforcement activities on taxpayers' compliance behavior. Using a dynamic panel estimation method, he concludes that criminal investigation activities often have a measurable and signifi cant effect on voluntary tax compliance; he fi nds that incarceration and probation have the most signifi cant effect on reported taxes, while sentenced cases and media attention do not have a signifi cant infl uence. 3 As noted by an anonymous referee, penalties and additional assessments normally refl ect audit results for several years, which may magnify the impact of an audit. 4 Cowell (1990) , Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) , , and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) provide comprehensive reviews of the tax evasion literature, on both the theoretical and empirical fronts. 5 Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987; use tax collections per return fi led or returns fi led per capita as dependent variables. Explanatory variables include the audit rate and socio-economic variables (e.g., the unemployment rate, the percentage of the audit population with a high school education, income per capita, the percentage of the population over 45 (or over 65), the percentage of the population in manufacturing or in services, the number of farms per capita). Their choice of instruments for the audit rate varies, and includes the state-level IRS budget per return fi led, the percentage of individual income tax returns fi led in total tax returns fi led, or the number of information returns other than W-2 forms per tax return fi led. 6 "Incarceration" includes confi nement to federal prison, a halfway house, home detention, or some combination thereof. "Probation" is the suspension of all or part of a jail sentence under certain conditions. "Sentenced cases" represent the fi nal verdict on tax-related crimes by the U.S. courts of law. While incarceration and probation may imply an ongoing process, sentencing suggests a fi nished, closed case. Media attention simply implies the release of information to different electronic or print media.
In related work, Witte and Woodbury (1985) and Dubin and Wilde (1988) use Taxpayer Compliance Measurement  Program (TCMP) data for the single year  1969, aggregated to the three-digit zip  code level and broken down by audit class, to estimate the impact of audit rates on a predicted measure of noncompliance. Witte and Woodbury (1985) do not control for potential endogeneity of the audit rate in the three-digit zip code location, while Dubin and Wilde (1988) use 2SLS methods to control for endogeneity. Their results are quite different: Witte and Woodbury (1985) fi nd a signifi cant deterrent effect of audits on noncompliance, while Dubin and Wilde (1988) fi nd that the audit rate has a signifi cant impact in only one of the seven audit classes. See also Jou (1992) .
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In sum, these past studies, even without always confronting the issues of dynamics and interdependence, present confl icting evidence as to the relative importance of sanctions and audit rates on tax compliance. Enforcement is negatively related to evasion in most all theoretical models of tax compliance, but audit rates are often statistically insignificant in empirical studies. Importantly, there are no empirical studies that address the twin issues of dynamics and interdependence. In the next sections, we develop a simple theoretical model that incorporates both issues, and we then test empirically their importance.
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE WITH DYNAMICS AND INTERDEPENDENCE
Let us start with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Consider an individual i whose true income at time t, Y it , is known only to him or her but not to the tax authority. Income taxes are levied at a constant rate τ it on declared income. With some probability p it , taxpayer i will be subject to investigation by the tax authority in time t, and, if found to have underreported income, the taxpayer will be subject to a penalty rate θ it (θ it > τ it .) on the evaded income E it . To incorporate dynamics and interdependence, taxpayer i in evading the amount E it from the tax authority in period t takes into consideration the amount successfully evaded in the previous period E it-1 by himself or herself, as well as the amount E jt contemporaneously evaded by another, "average" taxpayer j (≠i). The IRS audit rule is assumed to be one in which the decision to audit individual taxpayer i this year depends on how much that individual i evaded last year as well as on how much another individual j evades this year. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) fi rst-order condition can be derived as Insofar as the sign of dp it (.)/ dE jt or dp it (.)/dE it-1 cannot be determined a priori, the sign of the impact of either E jt or E it-1 (or both) must be determined empirically.
The solution of the taxpayer's utility maximization results in the following general functional form:
where X it is a set of characteristics that infl uences the evasion behavior of the individual and E it , E it-1 , and E jt are as defi ned above. Importantly, E it depends upon the dynamic (or persistent) behavior of individual i through E it-1 , and also upon the interdependent (or spatial) behavior of other taxpayers through E jt . In the next section, we discuss our data, and we also describe our approach to incorporating these dynamic and spatial effects. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

General Specifi cation
We posit a general panel model in which individual i's income tax evasion E it depends on individual j's income tax evasion behavior, on individual i's past income tax evasion, and on a set of local socioeconomic variables, or
Since we use a cross-section of states over time, subscripts i and t represent an average individual in the state and time period, respectively; ρ is a scalar parameter measuring the slope of the reaction function; ω ij are spatial weights used to compute the effect of individual income tax evasion of state j relevant to state i, where ω ij ≠ 0 if individuals in states i and j interact strategically and by convention ω ii = 0; x it is a (k × 1) vector of individual i's socioeconomic conditions; γ is the coeffi cient of persistence in evasion; and β is the corresponding vector of coeffi cients on the other conditioning variables. We assume that the parameters ρ, γ, and β are constant across time and space.
Note that our spatial and the dynamic analyses are special cases of this general panel model. For brevity, we discuss the estimation technique in one type of analysis assuming that the other effect is absent, before suggesting a way to combine both spatial and dynamic effects in a single estimation method. Further, we omit discussion of the features of the model when neither spatial effects through the dependent variable (or the error term) nor dynamic effects are present, for it then becomes a typical panel model whose features and estimation techniques are outlined in any standard text on panel econometrics. However, it should be noted that even a simple fi xed or random effects model will produce biased results here since the audit rate is endogenous.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis is based primarily on the state, district, and regional level data collected from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue and the IRS Data Book for 1979 to 1997. These publications contain state-level information on the number of individual income tax returns fi led, the number of returns examined, and the amounts of additional taxes and penalties recommended by the IRS offi ces at the district and regional levels. 9 The recent IRS Reform Act reorganized the entire district system, and required many district offi ces to be responsible for the tax returns fi led by multiple states. As a result, most of the district-level statistics in 1997 include services provided to multiple states. Since only state-level data are used in our analysis, we take the 1996 allocations of examinations and of additional taxes for each state among all states in the newly defi ned districts, and we extrapolate the annual fi gures for 1997 based on the 1996 proportions. For states with multiple districts, we aggregate the district-level data to the state level. Further, data on adjusted gross income (AGI), the number of returns with wages and salaries, the number with itemized deductions, and the total number of exemptions are obtained from the Statistics of Income Bulletin of the IRS.
This information is augmented by data on retail-trade employment, proprietors' employment, service-sector employment, and total employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Data on total population, non-white population, and population over 65 years of age, as well as the Gini coeffi cient, are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States from the Bureau of the Census. Unemployment data are obtained from the Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics. Along with the variables dictated by the tax evasion model, these additional variables have been used as control variables in many of the previous studies. For example, there is much empirical evidence that socio-demographic variables (e.g., the percent elderly population or the percent non-white population) are correlated with tax evasion (Andreoni, Erard, Feinstein, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002) . The Gini coeffi cient is included to capture the effects of the distribution of income on evasion, perhaps through a factor like the social norm of compliance; that is, individuals may be less inclined to pay taxes when they feel that the underlying distribution of income refl ects greater inequality.
From the IRS data, additional taxes and penalties recommended are divided by the number of individual income tax returns filed in a state to get a proxy for individual income tax evasion (E it ), which is the dependent variable in our empirical analysis. Additional taxes and penalties recommended differ from the additional taxes and penalties assessed due to subsequent bilateral and legal settlements between the IRS and the individual. Unfortunately, data on the additional taxes and penalties assessed are not available. 10 We use the number of individual income tax returns examined divided by the number of individual income tax returns fi led (expressed as a percent) to get a proxy for the individual income tax audit rate. Audit rates have been the focus of much attention in the tax evasion literature, and the IRS believes that audits are one of their most effective deterrent tools. Note that the central focus on audit rates seems to be changing in the IRS, as other deterrence and enforcement tools have been introduced to supplement the declining role of audits.
11 Unfortunately, data on these tools by state and by year are not publicly available.
We form four new variables from data available in the Statistics of Income Bulletin and the IRS Data Book: per return adjusted gross income (or AGI divided by the number of individual income tax returns fi led); the percent of returns fi led with wages and salaries (or the total number of returns fi led with wages and salaries divided by the total number of returns fi led); the percent of returns fi led with itemized deductions (or the total number of returns fi led with itemized deductions divided by the 10 The IRS spends around $28 per return in total administrative costs. Of this total per return cost, $22 is incurred as compensation to the personnel at the national offi ce and the fi eld staff in the IRS districts and regions. Of the rest, a sizeable amount is spent for legal pursuit of the cases against the tax evaders. 11 In recent years audit rates have been slightly less than one percent. However, while overall audit rates are quite low, among certain income and occupation classes they are more frequent. Further, the IRS audit rate is somewhat of an understatement because the reported rate usually refers to full audits. In fact, the IRS conducts a wide range of audits, including line matching and requests for information, and these other audits are much more frequent. For example, in 2005 only 1.2 million individual returns (or less than one percent of the 131 million individual returns fi led) were actually audited. However, in that same year the IRS sent 3.1 million "math error notices" and received nearly 1.5 billion "information returns" from third parties; the latter are used to verify items reported on individual income tax returns.
total number of returns fi led); and the per return exemptions (or the total number of exemptions claimed divided by the total number of returns fi led). From the BEA employment data, we create three series: the percent of proprietors' employment, the percent of retail-trade employment, and the percent of service-sector employment. In each case the variable is calculated as the total number of people employed in the relevant sector divided by the total number of people employed.
In order to test the relationship between tax rates and the tax evasion, we use the dollar weighted marginal tax rates available from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
12 These rates are calculated by the NBER TAX-SIM model from micro-level data for a sample of U.S. taxpayers. The fi gures are generated by calculating the tax liability of each eligible return, and then increasing all income types by one percent and recalculating the tax liability under the assumption that itemized deductions are constant. The difference in aggregate tax divided by the difference in aggregate income is the marginal tax rate on the average dollar of income. These rates take into account most features of the tax code (e.g., the maximum tax, the minimum tax, the alternative minimum tax, partial inclusion of social security taxes, the earned income tax credit, phaseouts of the standard deduction, the lowest bracket rate). Because state of residence for taxpayers with AGI greater than $200,000 is not given in the data, high-income taxpayers are assigned randomly to states in proportion to the number of high-income taxpayers listed in the Statistics of Income annual volumes.
Data on marital status are obtained from the NBER. 13 These data are also unavailable by state and by year for returns with AGI greater than $200,000, so that these high-income returns are prorated based on the distribution of income in the state in that particular year.
The definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are presented in Table 1 . The average real per return evasion of individual income taxes is $3,774 over the sample period, which is somewhat lower than some other TCMP-based work. The mean individual income tax audit rate is 1.4 percent. The average marginal income tax rate (state and federal combined) is 30 percent, and varies between 22 and 43 percent across states and years. The mean real AGI for the entire period is $29,532, an amount equivalent to $33,784 in 1997 prices (e.g., the last year of data used). About 85 percent of the returns are fi led by earners of wages and salaries, and these returns contain information on income and tax withheld by the employers. About one-third of the returns fi led use itemized deductions, and more than two exemptions for dependants are claimed. However, there are wide variations in both fi ling with itemized deductions and claimants of dependents across years and states. Around half of the returns are fi led jointly by married couples.
In the estimation results reported here, we measure the dependent variable (or per return evasion) in level form; our reported estimations also use all explanatory variables in level form where appropriate. However, we have also estimated all models with per return evasion and several explanatory variables (e.g., state AGI), entered in log form. We have also estimated all models with the dependent variable measured as per return evasion divided by state AGI. These alternative specifications are mainly intended to reduce any potential impact of the wide variation in state AGI on our estimation results. In all cases, our results are unaffected, and so we focus the discussion on our basic specifi cation (e.g., the dependent variable is measured as per return evasion and explanatory variables are measured in level form).
14
Econometric Methods
Our estimation methods must address a number of issues in the estimation of the panel model: endogeneity of the audit rate, incorporation of spatial dependence alone, incorporation of dynamic behavior alone, and incorporation of both spatial dependence and dynamic behavior. Each issue is discussed in turn.
Estimation of a Panel Model with an Endogenous Audit Rate
Since the audit rate is endogenous, we need to fi nd proper instruments that are not correlated with the level of tax evasion but that infl uence the audit selection. 15 We use as instruments the political affi liation of the President of the United States, the composition of both chambers of the U.S. Congress, and the party affi liation of the relevant state governor. The choice of these instruments is guided by Scholz and Wood (1998) , who argue that audit enforcement is by and large governed by the response of the IRS to elected offi cials. Like Scholz and Wood (1998) , our assump- We are grateful to the editor and to two anonymous referees for these suggestions. All estimation results are available upon request. 15 Some previous studies have used the IRS cost per return as an instrument for this purpose. However, we believe that this variable is likely to be an inappropriate instrument, given that both the cost per return and the audit rate may be jointly determined. Also, the cost per return is not independent of the level of tax evasion, which violates the standard assumption for a valid instrument. In order to investigate our concerns, we checked the validity of this alternative instrument. When the cost per return is used alone as an instrument, it makes the audit coeffi cient statistically insignifi cant; when used with other instruments, we reject the test of over-identifying restriction.
tion is that the audit rate in the individual income tax would be lower if the party affi liation of the President is Democratic, the Senate and the House each have a Democratic majority, and the state governor is Democratic. This negative association can be expected not because the Democrats are lenient to tax evaders but because they are self-proclaimed to be "pro-public" as opposed to "pro-corporation" or "pro-rich." We check the validity of our instruments using the Sargan (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions, and fi nd that our instruments are valid. We address the choice of instruments further when discussing the fi xed and random effects instrumental variable estimates.
Estimation of a Model of Spatial Panel Dependence with Spatial Error Correlation
The usual panel models, spatial panel models, and dynamic panel models are all special cases of the general model in equations [8] and [9] . For instance, let us assume that the dynamic effect is absent. Then, forming vectors of observations in i, the model becomes simply:
where E t = (E 1t ,…,E Nt ) is an (N × 1) vector of individual income tax evasion for the cross-section of N states at time t; W t is an (N × N) matrix of spatial weights; X t is an (N × k) matrix with rows given by the set of vectors x it from equation [9]; η t is an (N × 1) vector of the unobserved heterogeneity, and u t is the corresponding (N × 1) error term vector. Under this structure, tax evasion is determined endogenously in equilibrium because the spatial lag term (or W t E t ) is correlated with the error term u t and, hence, OLS yields inconsistent estimates. The latter is, however, a minimal requirement for a useful estimator, and it is, therefore, commonly suggested to overcome this problem by using maximum likelihood techniques (Anselin, 1988; Anselin and Hudak, 1992 where ε t is distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix σ ε 2 I N . In this case, spatial dependence in the error term (e.g., resulting from similar geographical conditions) can induce correlation in tax evasion even though individuals may have no interactions. Uncorrected spatial correlation in the error term would not affect the unbiasedness of the estimated parameters in β but would reduce its effi ciency. If there is strategic interaction (ρ ≠ 0), ignoring the spatial lag term W t E t in the estimation is more serious, since this yields inconsistent estimates of β. It is important, therefore, to test for both kinds of spatial dependence, in the dependent variable and in the error term.
Maximum likelihood estimation is complicated when one accounts for spatial correlation in the error term by possible identifi cation problems (Anselin, 1988) . We follow the instrumental variables approach because it avoids this issue, it is computationally easier to implement, and it does not require distributional assumptions on the error term ε. We assume that the parameters (β, ρ) and (σ ε 2 , λ) are time invariant, which allows us to estimate the model pooling the panel of observations, stacking them over the time index as
where E = (E 1 ′,…, E T ′)and ε = (ε 1 ′,…, ε T ′) are (NT × 1) vectors, with T equal to the total number of periods; X is the (NT × k) matrix of stacked exogenous variables; η is a (NT × 1) vector of the unobserved heterogeneity; W is an (NT × NT) blockdiagonal matrix of spatial weights, with T copies of W along the diagonal in the case of time invariant weights and with matrices (W 1 ,…, W T ) in the case of time variant weights; I N is an (N × N) identity matrix; and i T is a (T × 1) vector of unity. We assume that the covariance matrix of ε is given by σ ε 2 I NT . When the true model is given by equations [12] and [13], we can apply the Kelejian and Prucha (1998) generalized two stage least squares (G2SLS) procedure, performed in three steps. In the fi rst step, the (demeaned) regression model in [12] is estimated by a 2SLS procedure using the instruments H ⊂ [X, WX, W 2 X] that are linearly independent columns. In the second step, the spatial error correlation parameter λ is estimated in terms of the residuals obtained via the fi rst step and the generalized moments procedure suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999 
By construction, the differenced lag of the tax evasion equation (E it-1 -E it-2 ) in the above equation is endogenous. Further, as noted earlier, x it contains endogenous variables (e.g., the audit rates (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . To deal with this potential problem with the differenced GMM estimates, Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an estimator that makes use of additional information in levels. This new estimator is referred to as the system GMM estimator. This approach combines two sets of equations-one set in the fi rst differences and another in levels-into a system of equations. This introduces an additional T -2 moment restrictions given by
The system GMM estimator uses the moment conditions in equations [16] to [19] to consistently estimate the parameters of interest in equation [8] .
It should be noted that valid instruments should be correlated with the included endogenous explanatory variables, and at the same time should be orthogonal to the error term. To ensure the validity of the instruments, we conduct the Sargan (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions to test jointly the appropriateness of the instruments. 16 The null for the test is that the instruments are valid in that they are not correlated with the errors. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as χ
, where L is the number of instruments and k is the number of parameters in the model.
Further, as noted earlier, the consistency of the GMM estimation depends on whether errors in the levels equation are white noise. If the errors are serially correlated, then the GMM estimator will lose its consistency. We, thus, test for second order autocorrelation in the differenced equation using the test statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . By construction, we expect first order serial correlation in fi rst differenced equation but not second or higher order serial correlations.
Estimation of a Spatial Dynamic Panel Model
We have argued that both spatial effects and dynamic effects are present in the tax evasion decision of individuals. These twin characteristics distinguish the parameter estimation problem from standard panel (static or dynamic) estimation and spatial estimation, for several reasons. Due to the presence of spatial dependence (and spatial error), the typical panel estimation will render biased and inconsistent results. The presence of dynamic effects will also make the standard panel estimator biased and inconsistent. Further, the GMM dynamic panel method will most likely yield ineffi cient estimates. However, a unifi ed approach that accounts for both the spatial and the dynamic effects is, to our knowledge, not currently available. 17 To address these challenges, we follow a two-step approach. First, we fi lter the data to decompose the data into spatial and non-spatial components. 18 Second, we apply a GMM panel estimation based on the non-spatial component of the data.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
As with our discussion of econometric methods, our discussion of the estimation results proceeds in stages. We fi rst discuss estimation of a panel model that considers only endogeneity of the audit rate but without spatial or dynamic considerations. We then incorporate spatial dependence alone, dynamic behavior alone, and fi nally both spatial dependence and dynamic behavior. As noted earlier, our reported estimation results use as the dependent variable per return evasion and also measure all variables in level form. However, we have estimated numerous alternative specifi cations, including those in which the dependent variable and relevant explanatory variables are entered in log form and in which the dependent variable is scaled by state AGI. Our basic results are unaffected; in particular, the estimated responses of evasion to audit rates and other control variables are virtually unchanged by these alternative specifi cations.
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Results from a Panel Model with an Endogenous Audit Rate Table 2 reports the results of the simple fi xed and random effects panel models with treatment given to the endogeneity of the audit rate but ignoring both spatial and dynamic effects. Even though these are intermediate results, we discuss them briefl y, and compare them to the fi ndings of some previous studies. 20 17 To our knowledge, the only paper that has attempted this issue is Badinger, Muller, and Tondl (2004) , who apply the Getis (1995) fi ltering approach to estimate the growth convergence of the European countries. Getis and Griffi th (2002) show that the use of either approach yields similar results. 18 At present, two approaches are available to identify spatial effects in the data. One approach is based on the so-called Gi statistic following Getis (1995) , which requires that all variables are positive and can be measured from the natural origin. The other is based on the eigen function decomposition approach following Griffi th (1996; 2000) . Filtering under this approach relies on a decomposition of the Moran's I statistic as a measure of the global spatial autocorrelation structure. Griffi th (2000) shows that a given Moran's I value can be expressed as a weighted sum of the eigen values of the matrix
where W is an N × N matrix of binary contiguity spatial weights; N is the number of regions (in our case, states); I is an N × N identity matrix; i is an N × 1 vector of ones; and T is the matrix transpose. The eigen vectors of the C matrix are utilized to separate spatial from non-spatial components. Generally, spatial dependencies are represented by the system of orthogonal eigen vectors, which identify distinct geographic map patterns. A stepwise regression is then used to select those eigen vectors that furnish a good description of each original variable. The predicted value of such a regression constitutes the spatial autocorrelation component of a variable, whereas the vector of residuals constitutes the spatially fi ltered variable. Getis (1995) lists a number of critical conditions for a credential spatial fi ltering, including that the residuals from the fi ltered regression should not be spatially correlated and that the explanatory variables should not lose their statistical signifi cance after spatial dependence has been removed from them. 19 All estimation results are available upon request. 20 Note several features of this analysis. First, we conduct tests for individual heterogeneity by performing an F-test with the null that there is no individual heterogeneity; see Baltagi (2001) for details. The test statistic reported in Table 2 rejects the null at the one percent signifi cance level, and so there is evidence of individual effects in the data. Second, as noted earlier, we also conduct the Hausman (1978) test in order to decide which set of results are valid. The estimated test statistic reported at the bottom of Table 2 implies that the explanatory variables are correlated with the individual heterogeneity, so that fi xed effects estimation is the appropriate procedure. Third, since we have only one endogenous variable and we use three instruments for it, we conduct the test of over-identifying restrictions following Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) . The test statistic reported in Table 2 shows that the instruments are valid. Our test for endogeneity of the audit rate indicates that it is endogenous. This test proceeds in two stages. In the fi rst stage, we regress the audit rate on the party affi liation of the U.S. President, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in both chambers of the federal government, the party affi liation of state governors, and all other explanatory variables in the original model. 21 In the second stage, we substitute the predicted value of the audit rate for the actual audit rate and estimate the model by typical panel methods. The results support the hypothesis that the audit rate is endogenously determined because the estimate for the residual of the audit rate from the fi rst stage regression is different from zero at the ten percent signifi cance level.
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Most of the explanatory variables included in Table 2 affect tax evasion at the ten percent level with expected signs. Based on these results, one might arrive at conclusions similar to Jou (1992) but opposite of Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) , although the latter authors used different dependent variables than ours in their analysis. However, these previous results, albeit corrected for endogeneity of the audit rate, are still biased because both dynamic and spatial effects are ignored.
Results from a Model of Spatial Panel Dependence with Spatial Error Correlation
Estimation of the tax evasion model specified in equations [13] and [14] requires specification of proximity of states. According to the theory outlined earlier, individual i's tax evasion behavior is dependent on individual j's behavior. Given the per capita state data on evasion, some metric of proximity must be used. However, the weight matrix must be exogenous to the regressors. Anselin (2002) Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * implies signifi cance at 10 percent, ** implies signifi cance at 5 percent, and *** implies signifi cance at 1 percent. Figures in brackets are p-values. As the F-statistic of the excluded instruments is greater than 10, one can invoke the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb, and can conclude that the instruments are weak. 22 The results for the test of endogeneity of the audit rate are the following. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * implies signifi cance at 10 percent, ** implies signifi cance at 5 percent, and *** implies signifi cance at 1 percent. Only the coeffi cients associated with the actual audit rate and the residual from the fi rst stage regression are reported.
linear, with endogeneity problems that must be instrumented out. As a result of this constraint, we rule out the use of a weight matrix based on either income or population. At the same time, the weight must be meaningful enough to represent dependence in the dependent variable or in the error term. In view of these considerations, we select three alternative metrics: the neighbors belong to the same division in the U.S. Bureau of Census, the neighbors belong to the same region in the BEA, and the neighbors belong to the same region in the IRS. Note that clustering of states based on any of these metrics is not ad hoc; rather, clustering is based on the comovement of several socioeconomic factors. As such, these matrices contain both time variant information (e.g., per capita income differentials) and time invariant information (e.g., geographic proximity). Besides, the spatial fi ltering methods used here can handle weight matrices only with binary elements.
As indicated earlier, the efficiency properties of estimators and of other statistics depend upon whether a model's disturbance terms are indeed spatially correlated, and also upon whether the models have a spatially lagged dependent variable. As a result, it is important to estimate spatial correlation both in the dependent variable and in the error term, and then to check if there is any strategic dependence in the dependent variable and in the error term. Any evidence in either of these renders the panel estimates biased and/or inconsistent. Table 3 reports the results of the general spatial model. (Remember that these results still ignore dynamic persistence.) The spatial lag coeffi cient is not precise when the weight matrix is defi ned following BEA regions or Census divisions; it is only marginally signifi cant when the weight matrix follows the IRS regions. These last results indicate that there is strategic interaction among neighboring states in the determination of individual income tax evasion. Furthermore, this interaction suggests a positively sloped reaction function in tax evasion, so that more evasion in a neighboring state is associated with more evasion in the own state. Of course, our estimation results cannot identify the exact mechanisms that underlie this behavior, but can simply indicate that "region" (e.g., spatiality) matters in tax evasion behavior. In terms of an elasticity, the response to a ten percent increase in individual income tax evasion in the neighboring states results in an increase of 2.4 percent in the own state's individual income tax evasion.
Most of the explanatory variables in Table 3 are statistically signifi cant. The audit rate has a consistently negative and signifi cant impact on evasion whose magnitude is similar across weight matrices. Even so, it is evident that there are substantial spatial error effects. Since we have found some evidence that is consistent with strategic interaction, the effects of the exogenous variables will have an impact on the entire confi guration of equilibrium levels of tax evasion. This is true even if the effects take place in only one of the interacting states; through their repercussions on that state's tax evasion, they will exert effects on the tax evasion behavior of the other states. As detailed later, the so-called Moran I and LM statistics vindicate our claim. Remember, however, that the spatial estimation results remain biased and inconsistent because persistence is not considered.
Results from a Dynamic Panel Model
The results of Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic GMM estimation are presented Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * implies signifi cance at 10 percent; ** implies signifi cance at 5 percent; *** implies signifi cance at 1 percent.
in Table 4 . 23 Based on the Hansen (1982) test statistics, the optimal lag is found to be one year. The exogenous variables and the difference of the lagged dependent variable are used as instruments in the level equation; the lagged dependent variable is the instrument in the fi rst-difference equation. Thus, each regressor appears in the instrument matrix. Arellano and Bond (1991) test for AR(1) and AR(2) in fi rst differences. The test for no second-order serial correlation of the disturbances of the fi rst-differenced equation is important for the consistency of the GMM estimator. In addition, the Hansen (1982) J test for the joint validity of the moment conditions (e.g., the presence of over-identification) is crucial to the validity of GMM estimates.
Consider fi rst the results that incorporate dynamic behavior but ignore spatial dependence (e.g., unfiltered data, or column 1). Most coeffi cients meet expectations; in particular, the audit rate has a large, negative, and statistically signifi cant impact on tax evasion. However, when we compare the unfi ltered with the fi ltered results, the coeffi cient estimates for most other variables for the unfi ltered data are often on the high end of the spectrum. Even so, the spatial diagnostic tests in Table 5 indicate serious spatial correlations, so that the unfi ltered results are potentially misleading. The results of Moran I and the LM statistics presented in Table 5 imply that there are indeed spatial effects no matter what form of the contiguity weight matrix is used. In short, we must consider both dynamic and spatial effects, as we do next.
Results from a Spatial Dynamic Panel Model
The remaining results in Table 4 incorporate both spatial and dynamic considerations, and it is these results upon which we focus. We fi nd that a higher audit rate reduces the level of evasion irrespective of the type of weight matrix used. Our results suggest that raising the audit rate by one percentage point decreases the level of evasion by 0.5 percent. This response translates to an immediate, short-run reduction of tax evasion of more than $1500 per individual; given the estimated persistence of around one quarter, the long-run reduction is more than $2000 per individual. These results offer strong support for the "ripple effect" of audits identifi ed by Witte and Woodbury (1985) , Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987; , Dubin and Wilde (1987) , Jou (1992) , Plumley (1997) , and Dubin (2007) . Our results also suggest that the decline in the audit rate over the last three decades may be largely responsible for the decline in voluntary tax compliance; for a similar conclusion, see Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987; . These estimated responses to audit rates are insensitive to alternative specifi cations. For example, when the relevant variables are measured in log form, the evasion-audit elasticity remains largely unchanged, at roughly -0.4 across the different weight matrices. Similarly, when the dependent variable per return evasion is normalized by state AGI, the elasticity is again unaffected. Most demographic variables also are unaffected in sign and signifi cance by the alternative specifi cations. 23 Note that, in order to check the validity of the instruments used in the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimates, we test for overidentifying restrictions. The Hansen (1982) statistic reported at the bottom of Table  4 implies that the lagged values used as instruments satisfy the moment conditions (equations [16] to [19] ). The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimators introduce fi rst order serial correlation in the data, but, if there are higher order serial correlations in the data, then use of this estimator is inappropriate. We also test for fi rst and second order serial correlation following Arellano and Bond (1991) . These results show evidence of fi rst order serial correlation but the absence of second order serial correlation. Other results are also of interest. An increase in the combined federal and state marginal tax rate by ten percentage points decreases the level of evasion by fi ve to eight percentage points in the short run. Given the level of persistence, this implies an almost one-to-one negative relationship between the marginal tax rate and the level of evasion. This result is similar to that of Feinstein (1991); however, several other empirical studies fi nd that higher tax rates lead to more tax evasion (Clotfelter, 1983; Slemrod, 1985; Crane and Nourzad, 1992) . Experimental studies also give confl icting results on the impact of tax rates on tax evasion (Beck, Davis, and Jung, 1991; Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992; Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan, 1995) .
The coeffi cient of AGI is positive and signifi cant except when the weight matrix is BEA regions. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of increasing absolute risk aversion. Our results suggest that a one percent increase in AGI leads to more than a one percent increase in evasion in the short run and more than a one and a half percent increase in the long run.
The percent of returns fi led with wages and salaries is associated with higher compliance. There are several possible factors for such a strong positive relationship. First, as wages and salaries are reported by a third party to the IRS, taxpayers may believe that detection of evasion is more likely with these types of income. In addition, these incomes are relatively simple to report on a tax form. Our results suggest that a one percent increase in the returns fi led with wages and salaries would be associated with a 1.5 to 2.0 percent decline in the level of evasion in the short run and more than a two percent decline in the long run. In contrast, itemized deductions and the number of exemptions are not subject to any verifi cation unless the return is audited. These variables are found to be positively associated with the level of evasion. While a one percent increase in the returns with itemized deductions increases evasion by about $100, the successful claim of an additional exemption per return increases evasion by more than $1000.
Several past studies suggest that individuals in certain business sectors are likely candidates for noncompliance, including sole proprietorships, retail trade, and service sector employment, with an expected positive relationship between evasion and each sector (Clotfelter, 1983; Erard, 1992) . Our results are mixed. We fi nd a strong negative relationship between evasion and the percent share of proprietorship, but a positive and imprecise relationship between the other two sectors.
The elderly population appears to have some tendency to evade less than their younger counterparts, although the coeffi cient estimates are imprecise. Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) found a similar relationship in their estimation. The percent of population that is non-white is not signifi cantly related to evasion, although there is an imprecise but positive relationship between their fraction in the population and the level of evasion. It is sometimes postulated that social norms break down in societies with high income inequality. We, therefore, expect a positive relationship between the level of tax evasion and the extent of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coeffi cient. Our results by and large corroborate this notion, although the coeffi cient estimates are not precise.
The positive relationship between the rate of unemployment and the level of evasion suggests that evasion becomes higher during economic recession. These findings are similar to most previous studies (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1990; Jou, 1992) . One of the reasons for this relationship could be that unemployed people work in the underground economy for cash payments and do not report their income. Our results suggest that a three percent reduction in the unemployment rate would lead to about one percent decline in the level of evasion in the short run and more than one percent in the long run. Finally, there is some tendency for married couples to evade less than the other groups, although the parameter estimates are also imprecise.
CONCLUSIONS
The identifi cation of persistence and strategic interaction in models of individual income tax evasion has important implications for the equilibrium confi guration of tax evasion. In this paper we modify the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of individual income tax evasion to incorporate dynamic effects and spatial dependence, and we then test this modifi ed model with state-level, time-series, cross-section data for the years 1979 to 1997, in order to estimate the factors that affect annual per return evasion of the individual income tax.
We fi nd that correct treatment of spatial dependence is essential to tax evasion analysis and that filtering is a practical, non-parametric alternative that can address this issue. We also fi nd that GMM panel estimation (in combination with fi ltering) can address the dynamic aspects of the evasion decision.
When these factors are incorporated, we fi nd strong evidence of both persistence and strategic interaction among individuals in their tax evasion behavior. With persistence, our estimation results indicate both short-and long-run effects of audit rates on compliance. With spatiality, we fi nd that interaction among states that belong to a particular group or region based on the BEA, Census, or IRS criteria appears to result in dependence, weakly through the level of evasion but strongly through common but unidentifi ed shocks. As emphasized earlier, these latter results indicate mainly that evasion depends upon the state in which one lives, together with one's neighboring states; the results do not allow us to specify the precise channels through which spatiality actually works.
In particular, estimation results from our spatial dynamic panel model indicate that tax evasion falls with higher audit rates, higher marginal tax rates, lower AGI, greater use of wage and salary withholding, reduced use of itemized deductions and exemptions, less inequality, and lower unemployment; there are also some varied sectoral and demographic effects. Indeed, when spatial and dynamic effects are appropriately considered, our estimation results suggest that raising the audit rate by one percentage point decreases the level of evasion by 0.5 percent, which translates to an immediate short-run reduction in tax evasion of more than $1500 per individual, and a long-run reduction of more than $2000 per individual. Other IRS policies to encourage compliance may include use of source withholding on income types and a greater verifi cation of deductions and exemptions. Broader economic policies that could improve compliance are efforts to reduce inequality and unemployment.
In short, the IRS has a range of policies to increase tax compliance. However, given the magnitude of its direct and indirect effects, audits must clearly remain a key part of any efforts to improve compliance.
